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The Antitrust Bulletin/Winter 1986
The unreasonableness of coerced
cooperation: a comment upon
the NCAA decision's rejection
of the Chicago school
BY JAMES F. PONSOLDT*
Introduction
The Supreme Court's decision in the NCAA case,' holding that
the NCAA's mandatory rules controlling the exclusive sale of
television rights to intercollegiate football violate section 1 of the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of
Law. The author was of counsel to the respondents in National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author expresses appreciation for the research
assistance of Jesse Barrow, J.D. 1985, University of Georgia School of
Law.
1 Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and the Univer-
sity of Georgia Athletic Association v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (D.C.W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 707 F2d
1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
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Sherman Antitrust Act,2 is important for several reasons. First, it
is among but a few decisions to hold that a restraint of trade
although not per se illegal3 is economically unreasonable under
the rule of reason. Second, its implied questions about the goals
and relevance of antitrust enforcement coincide with questions
about the governmental regulation of business now addressed in
law reviews, editorial pages, and by congressional committees.4
Last, it may resolve warring antitrust ideologies and reaffirm
economic freedom as an enforcement goal.
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides, in relevant part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. . ....
3 See, e.g., Lipner, Antitrust's Per Se Rule: Reports of Its Death
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 60 DENVER L.J. 593 (1983). One of the most
often cited descriptions of the per se rule was written by Justice Black in
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). "However,
there are certain agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. This principle of per se unreasonableness not only
makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act
more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investi-
gation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken. Among the practices which the courts have hereto-
fore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing,
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements." 356 U.S.
at 5 (citations omitted).
4 Compare Lester Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrust Laws, New
York Times Business Section, October 19, 1980, with Reader Comment,
New York Times Business Section, November 2, 1980; compare Fred
Smith, Why Not Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1983, with
Reader Comment, REGULATION, May-June, 1983; compare Ernest
Gellhorn's editorial regarding the tenure of William Baxter as chief
antitrust enforcer, Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, January 6, 1984,
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1004 1986
A comment upon NCAA : 1005
The NCAs Chicago school defense is premised on the idea
that government should normally defer to the presumptively
efficient decisions of business, especially those that enhance
economic integration and cooperation. Because of private
economic coercion in the marketplace and economic rivalry in
our political system, this idea is flawed. Fortunately, the NCAA
decision reaffirms that the Sherman Act was enacted to prohibit
the private exercise of economic coercion that undermines
economic freedom and diminishes market rivalry.'
with Reader Comment, Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, January 27,
1984; compare Ponsoldt, Antitrust: When Law Clashes With a Truth,
New York Times Editorial Page, January 3, 1984, with Eizenstat, A
New Antitrust Law, New York Times Editorial Page, April 22, 1984;
compare Ponsoldt, Reagan's Anti-Regulatory Stand Politicizes Policy
on Mergers, New York Times Editorial Page, October 13, 1983, with
James C. Miller, 3rd, The Proper Question in Adjudicating a Merger,
New York Times Editorial Page, October 23, 1983.
See, most recently, H. 2735, approved by the House Committee on
the Judiciary on June 14, 1985, which would establish stricter standards
for the approval of business mergers, and the accompanying subcom-
mittee record. As examples of the academic debate, compare Landes &
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937 (1981),
with Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections on
Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1980). See also
Ponsoldt, Reagan Circuit Judges Assault the Rule of Law, National
Law Journal Editorial Page, February 7, 1983, quoted in Shafer v. Bulk
Petroleum Corp., 569 F. Supp. 621, 625-26, n.4 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
5 The alleged choice between economic freedom and regulatory
order was poorly framed from the beginning. Unregulated private
conduct can curtail freedom and achieve a kind of "order" to a greater
degree than can democratically imposed government regulation. The
correctly identified political choice is not between freedom (noninter-
vention by government) and order (government regulation), as the
Reagan enforcement policies and economic theory have implied, but
rather between concentrations of power not responsive to citizen con-
trol, whether public or private, and a legitimately functioning democ-
racy with sufficient public regulation to check private trusts (whether
corporate, financial, or labor union) and sufficient internal control to
avoid bureaucratic tyranny. The NCAA decision confirms that the
Sherman Act was designed to promote freedom from private abuses of
power.
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Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected Chicago's ideological
vision for a historical and pragmatic approach that polices
business conduct to preserve our competitive free market system,
regardless of the short-term efficiency considerations.6
Conflicting theories of antitrust
Much of the ideological debate over section 1 of the Sherman
Act can be traced to disagreement over legislative purposes. 7 The
historical side of the debate sees the law protecting the competi-
6 "Broadcast Music squarely holds that a joint selling arrangement
may be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and thus
be procompetitive. See 441 U.S. at 18-23." NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
The alleged direct relationship between "efficiency" and "competition"
has not always been recognized by the Court. In fact, Justice Frankfur-
ter squarely acknowledged that, at least in the short run, activities which
promote efficiency can be anticompetitive, and vice versa, particularly
when the conduct which results in cost savings at the same time creates
market power, so that the efficient producer does not have to respond to
the commands of a competitive market. See Standard Oil Co. of
California (Standard Stations) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 309, 312
(1949). See also the concurring opinion by Douglas: "The economic
theories which the Court has read into the Antitrust Laws have favored
rather than discouraged monopoly. . . ." 337 U.S. at 315.
7 Professor Sullivan reviews two basic schools of thought, one he
calls the "Chicago" school, characterized by the use of only two "static,
structural models, the competitive market and the monopolized market"
to analyze industry performance. Sullivan contends that the Chicago
school relies on cartel and monopoly theory only to explain the
occurrence of noncompetitive performance. The school sees monopoly
as extremely rare and, since it recognizes few entry barriers, believes
cartels are extremely unstable. Sullivan closes his description of the
Chicago school with the sarcastic observation: "Chicago theory makes
for an attractively tidy antitrust world. Because private markets work
surpassingly well so long as government does not interfere with them,
and because most apparent aberrations turn out upon analysis to reflect
efficiency-producing decisions by traders operating under the con-
straints of competitive pressure, the antitrust policemen need not be
exceedingly busy. It is necessary to keep a sharp eye out for cartels, of
course, for, though cartels are always under pressure and soon fall
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tive market system by guaranteeing free and easy market entry,
by stimulating potential rivalry, and by dispersing private power.8
Chicago contends that wealth maximization is the exclusive anti-
apart, they may do some harm before that inevitable end. Thus, there is
some socially efficient level of investment in antitrust enforcement. All
that remains is for Congress to work out an efficient matrix of
deterrents and for enforcement agencies to direct their activities solely
toward those violations that Chicago school theory identifies as socially
harmful." Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What
Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214,
1216-18 (1977).
Sullivan characterizes the main competing tradition, which he calls
the "Harvard" school, as "proposing more complex and realistic
models, even at the cost of less theoretical solutions." He states the
so-called Harvard school is less likely to excuse oligopolistic industry
structure on the ground of scale efficiency and more likely to recognize
a variety of entry barriers. The school recognizes the possibility of
interdependent pricing in oligopolistic markets and sees ways in which
tying arrangements, requirements contracts, or vertical mergers can
harm competition. Id.
Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner, whom Sullivan identifies as
a member of the so-called Chicago school, responded that it is no longer
"a simple thing to identify a Harvard or a Chicago position on issues of
antitrust policy." He attributes this to "the maturing of economics as a
social science and as a corollary thereto, the waning of the sort of
industrial organization that provided the intellectual foundations of the
Harvard school." With its intellectual foundation withered away, ac-
cording to Posner, the two schools have joined on a variety of issues.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
8 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 5 (1977).
Sullivan comments in his treatise that the antitrust laws came out of a
"rough-hewn" populist tradition which saw wrong and right in "Dick-
ensian clarity" and mistrusted large institutions and "lords of com-
merce." He states that later, more sophisticated rationales emerged.
For one thing, competition kept private markets working toward
efficient resource allocation, efficient production methods, and efficient
methods of distribution. Here competition was a stick. The businessman
who was inefficient would lose out to his competitors.
Second, competition was seen as breaking up concentrations of
economic power which were dangerous in themselves, in the view of
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trust goal, thereby limiting the concept of "competition." It
regards efficiency the polestar of rational Sherman Act solu-
tions. 9
some. This meant there was less need for government intervention with
the attendant danger of loss of personal liberty.
Finally, competitive markets were seen as facilitating entry at the
smallest efficient scale and thereby promoting the goal of economic
opportunity. Id. Interestingly, this last justification finds historical
support in the English common-law tradition of refusing to enforce
contracts which would disable a person from plying his or her lawful
trade and hence becoming dead weight on society. This justification was
recognized by Circuit Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Presumably, English judges did not buy the theory that the person to
whom the right of contract was bargained was inherently more efficient
at plying the trade than the person who gave up the trade and that the
person who gave up the trade should therefore pursue some other line of
work which would, of course, be a more efficient use of labor.
Addyston, supra.
9 As noted above, an important member of this school of thought
is Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
who argues that economic efficiency should be the only goal of the
antitrust laws. He rejects sociopolitical arguments and interpretations of
the act. The argument that monopoly structure transfers consumer
wealth to the stockholders of monopolistic firms is, Posner argues,
incorrect because competition to obtain and hold monopoly status will
transfer expected monopoly gains into social costs and hence put the
gains back into society. The argument that economic concentration
facilitates industry manipulation of the political process to obtain
special legislation which will give the monopolist an inordinate or unfair
amount of protection is belied by the fact that many unconcentrated
industries-farming, local broadcasting, trucking, banking, and medi-
cine-enjoy governmental protection against competition in the form of
barriers to entry, restrictions on advertising, etc. The argument that the
Sherman Act was designed to protect small business fails, in Posner's
mind, because antitrust laws should not protect small businesses at the
expense of the consumer by allowing them to act inefficiently. Hence,
Posner concludes that efficiency is the sole appropriate goal of the
antitrust laws. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 3-21 (1976).
Posner's comments in this regard have been criticized on several
grounds. Among the criticisms is, first, that simply because, as Posner
argues (id. at 8-22), Congress recognized the "propensities" of monopo-
lies to raise prices by restricting output, it does not necessarily follow
that the proponents of the Sherman Act were concerned with the
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Sometimes the two sides reach similar conclusions. For exam-
ple, both would condemn market division agreements among
competitors. 0 But the two would disagree over industrial decon-
centration. The Chicago school would find data that industry,
due to- economies of scale and other economic factors, can
support few large competitors, and thus would de-emphasize the
importance of concentration.
The historical approach views antitrust as both political and
economic," something more than allocative efficiency." It encour-
modern notion of "economic efficiency." When the act was passed, the
economic models which support this philosophy were just being devel-
oped and hence were not available to the authors of the bill. Second, he
has been criticized for completely ignoring the goal of "diffusion and
decentralization of power as an end in itself." It is not hard to infer such
intent from Sherman Act coauthor Edmund's allusions to trusts as
"grinding tyrannies" and Senator Haar's complaint that the "great
monopolies . . . are a menace to republican institutions." Scherer, The
Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat From Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974,
977, 980 (1977) (book review of ANTITRUST LAW).
10 Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 384 (1966). In this case there
would be no integration of functions related to marketing a product.
The testing laboratory is not logically related to the market division.
Hence there is no potential economic efficiency created by the market
division.
11 See, e.g., Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics:
Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980).
Professor Sullivan describes this approach as "eclectic." He identifies
this tradition with many of the Warren Court's decisions.
Characteristic goals of this school include preservation of an
industrial structure composed "of large numbers of small competitors as
an end in itself." The Supreme Court, using this theory, has embraced a
"multivalued antitrust tradition" in which the concept of competition
served political and social objectives of twentieth-century liberalism.
The Court sought "easy market access for small businesses, protection
of dealer independence, and correction of wide disparity in bargaining
power." It also sought to assure that price and cost were closely related.
Id.
12 See, e.g., H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955).
See also Blake & Jones, Toward a Three Dimensional Antitrust Policy,
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ages rivalry to spur producers to greater effort, 3 and it prefers
decentralized power' and small economic units. For Professor
Sullivan the Sherman Act is a "response to" and "mediator of the
profound changes in technology and industrial structure that
have accrued in America over the course of the present century."
Chicago's neoclassicism fails to account for the "non-material
and less readily quantifiable welfare consequences of change in
technology and industrial structure." While economics should
play a role, case law must be supplemented by "something more
than economics" that Sullivan argues would include "social and
political values which are important components of anti-trust not
recognized by the neo-classical economics of the Chicago
School.""'
Others in the historical camp argue that the Sherman Act did
not result from "a consensus among economists as to its utility in
enhancing economic efficiency, but a rough consensus in society
at large as to its value in curbing the dangers of excessive market
power. . .[I]t is based on a political and moral judgment rather
than economic measurement or even distinctively economic crite-
65 COLUM. L. REv. 422, 423-24 (1965). Blake and Jones argue that the
goals of antitrust include preservation of "self-policing markets" and
"protection of individuals from oppression and foreclosure of oppor-
tunities by economically powerful interests," and that these goals may
be found in both the legislative history of the Sherman Act and the early
decisions and were not "smuggled into the law illicitly, under cover of
darkness," during the 1950s and 1960s. For a further discussion of this
topic, see Dewey, Competitive Policy and National Goals: The Doubtful
Relevance of Antitrust, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST 63, 85-87 (A.
Phillips ed. 1965) (arguing that antitrust cannot really be justified on
economic grounds, but must be based on policies "which seek to shake
the mighty in their seats" and protection of small producers).
13 This was the reasoning of Justice Clark's dissent in White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
14 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 8, at 11.
15 Sullivan, supra note 7. This should not be read, however, to
foreclose allocative efficiency as a goal of antitrust. These theorists
simply believe efficiency is not the only goal.
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ria."' 6 Sociologist Charles Lindblom argues that liberty depends
on competition and that markets like political systems must be
decentralized and diffused of influence and power, with mutual
adjustments so that individuals and small groups are free to
strive. 17
Moreover, the Supreme Court has argued in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States that Congress was concerned with the accumula-
tion of great wealth and power in the hands of a few:
The debates show that doubt as to whether there was a common
law of the United States which governed the subject in the absence of
legislation was among the influences leading to the passage of the act.
They conclusively show, however, that the main cause which led to
the legislation was the thought that it was required by the economic
conditions of the times, that is the vast accumulation of wealth in the
hands of corporations and individuals, the enormous development of
corporate organization, the facility for combination which such
organizations afforded, the fact that the facility was being used and
that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied and the
widespread impression that their power had been and would be
executed to oppress individuals and injure the public generally' 8
There is no mention of economic efficiency or wealth maximiza-
tion, but an instinctive mistrust of concentrated economic power
and a fear of individuals "oppressed" by wealth and power.
The Chicago school sees wealth maximization through
economic efficiency as the rational antitrust goal,"9 if not the
16 R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in
THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER EssAYs 232-34
(1965) (the author also reviews other works which make the same
argument).
17 C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 49, 165 (1977).
18 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51
(1910).
19 For instance, Bork and Bowman argue that antitrust law too
often protects inefficient producers from their competitive rivals. Bork
& Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363 (1965). See
also supra note 10.
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absolutely authentic, legislatively historical goal? ° It argues that
judges must shape statutes and histories to wealth maximization
and efficiency. Robert Bork, for example, interprets competition
as "a shorthand expression designating any state of affairs in
which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an
alternative state of affairs through judicial decree." As defined,
his version of competition includes such things as low prices,
innovation, and product choice," but not rivalry, an absence of
restraint, an inability to influence price through purchase or sale,
or dispersed ownership of production. Congress did have these
other things in mind in 1890, and if "our society is founded upon
the elimination of rivalry . . " Bork is probably correct that
some cooperation and integration are necessary to achieve effi-
cient production, but only within a larger core of democratic
liberties that Americans prefer to efficiency.
Bork dismisses the threat of market concentration, and argues
that the Brown Shoe term "fragmented" is unclear and "without
much content." He also rejects the relevance of competition to
locally owned businesses,' and argues that Congress' motives are
impossible to divine.
One frequently hears talk of the original meaning of the Sherman Act
of the intent of Congress in enacting that law, but it can hardly be
stressed too much that with respect to the Sherman Act, . . . such
talk of legislative intention is more than usually foolish. Congress
20 Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783 (1965).
21 Id. at 833. Bork argues that wealth maximization is a more
appropriate goal than the vindication of various political and social
goals because the courts need only make economic distinctions which
are firmly rooted in "economic reality." He continues that the policy of
wealth maximization is better suited to the "scope, nature and ease of
administration of the law, that the job of choosing what social values
should be protected should be with the legislature and that the 'wealth
maximization' standard creates certainty." R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 61 (1978).
22 R. BORK, supra note 21, at 60.
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simply had no discoverable intention that would help a court decide a
case one way or another.2 1
Elsewhere, though, Bork finds the legislative record surprisingly
luminous, especially the isolated comments of Senator Sherman
about the act not interfering with efficiency. To advance his
consumer welfare thesis,' 4 Bork eschews the rigorous interpretive
constancy he yearns for the courts to adopt. He bases law,
efficiency, and his consumer welfare idea on an extremely fragile
interpretive methodology.
The two schools also compete to determine the basis of
section 1 liability under a rule of per se illegality or a rule of
reason.? The per se rule, justified by concerns of judicial effi-
23 Bork, supra note 20.
24 Bork, Legislative Intent and Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7, 27 (1966).
25 See supra note 3 and infra note 26 and accompanying text. The
rule of reason condemns restraints that are more restrictive than
reasonably necessary to promote a procompetitive objective. Thus, the
rule of reason requires the court to analyze the ambiguous motives
underlying the conduct complained of, and the economic effects
thereof, to determine whether the conduct is primarily anticompetitive
or procompetitive. See Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S.
36, 57-60 (1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
234 (1918). See generally Zelek, Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason
Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 13 (1980); Comment,
Applying the Rule of Reason: A Survey of Recent Cases and Comment,
17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 335 (1980).
As a general matter, except for the NCAA decision, and the more
recent decision, consistent with NCAA, in FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986), the Court has applied an "all or
nothing" approach to section 1 analysis: either the challenged conduct is
per se illegal or the per se rule does not apply and the conduct is not
unreasonable.
Compare Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct.
1464 (1984), Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332
(1982), Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), and
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978) (condemning allegedly reasonable conduct under the per se
rule), with Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
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ciency, predictability, and certainty,2 prohibits presumptively anti-
competitive conduct outright. The Chicago school, because of its
abhorrence of government and preference for private action,
would not prohibit any conduct outright because efficiency can
result from diminished rivalry. Therefore, conduct that dimin-
ished competition could never be characterized as an illegal
restraint of trade without a rule of reason inquiry into possible
efficiencies. 27 Even cooperation among producers to stabilize
prices by restricting output, if integrated into a marketing struc-
ture that more efficiently sold product through eliminated trans-
action costs, should be lawful-as'the NCAA contended.
The conflict between the two schools first reflected itself in
the history of the Supreme Court's price-fixing cases. In United
States v. Trenton Potteries,29 the Court invalidated a price-fixing
Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985), Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (refusing to apply per se rule
and suggesting that challenged conduct was not economically unreason-
able).
26 Indeed, some commentators have declared that the rule of
reason, without the per se rule, is completely ineffective as an antitrust
enforcement tool. See, e.g., Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures
Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL.
453, 464 (1976): "The rule of reason, calling as it does for a considera-
tion of all facts or to exaggerate only slightly, all evidence that either
party thinks relevant-is to be blunt an ineffective tool for antitrust
enforcement."
27 Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason
Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 714 (1983). The author argues that since a
practice cannot be said to be price-fixing unless it has an anticompetitive
effect, a court must always examine the competitive effect of the
challenged conduct. "As a result, the distinction between characterizing
a practice as price fixing and determining its purpose and effect and
hence the distinction between the per se rule and rule of reason cannot
ultimately be maintained."
28 Frank Easterbrook has written that "under NCAA the defendant
may offer an economic justification even of a naked restraint." East-
erbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1984).
29 273 U.S. 392 (1926).
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scheme and rejected the defendants' argument that the prices
established were "reasonable." A similar argument was rejected
by Justice Douglas, in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil,30 who
held efficiency defenses antithetical to the Sherman Act.3 How-
ever, the Court has upheld the efficiencies of voluntary participa-
tion that reduce transaction costs through orderly marketing.3 2
Today, in evaluating private combinations, the Supreme Court
may find their coerciveness to be decisive.33 Indeed, the basic
disagreement in NCAA was over the efficiencies of cooperation
and integration achieved through coercion. An agreement that
limits the output of collegiate football broadcasts through a
coercion that limits rivalry should not be justifiable as an
economically efficient marketing arrangement.
30 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (prosecution of oil companies for buying up
surplus oil to keep the price of oil high).
31 "Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price cutting
and the like appear throughout our history as ostensible justifications
for price-fixing. If the so-called competitive abuses were to be appraised
here, the reasonableness of prices would necessarily become an issue in
every price fixing case. In that event the Sherman Act would soon be
emasculated. . . . It would not be the charter of freedom which its
framers intended." Id. at 221. This is basically the efficiency argument,
since the producers were arguing that they would not be able to operate
without the price restraints. Id.
32 "[A] bulk license of some type is a necessary consequence of the
integration necessary to achieve these efficiencies and a necessary
consequence of an aggregate license is that its price must be es-
tablished." Id. at 21.
33 See, e.g., Ponsoldt, The Application of Sherman Act Antiboy-
cott Law to Industry Self-Regulation: An Analysis Integrating Nonboy-
cott Sherman Act Principles, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 15-30 (1981) (arguing
that intent has been important in determining whether concerted action
violates antitrust laws).
34 See infra notes 143-159 and accompanying text.
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Background of the NCAA case
The NCAA is a voluntary nonprofit association organized in
1905 to promote and preserve amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics as a vital and integral part of higher education. The
NCAA has 752 colleges and universities, plus allied member
conferences and associated and affiliated members, each having
single voting rights. The membership elects a 22-member council
to establish and direct general policy.
NCAA legislation authorizes it to control both televising
football and the television contracts themselves. This authority
was exercised for one-, two-, and four-year terms over 30 years
with periodic membership approval. The NCAAs annual $23
million budget was financed mainly by the sale of basketball
tournament telecast rights, and by membership fees and an
assessment on football television revenues. The NCAA imple-
ments member action through committees, including a Football
Television Committee.
The NCAA complaint was brought by a member institution
and an athletic association that conducts the intercollegiate
athletic program of a member institution. The University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
contended that the NCAA had violated the antitrust laws and
deprived them of their lawful property rights by the dealings of
its Television Committee over the last 30 years. Plaintiffs sought
a declaratory judgment that the television contracts between the
NCAA and the networks were illegal and an injunction generally
prohibiting the NCAA from its continued reign over its members'
television rights."
35 Although plaintiffs dropped their request for class certification,
the action was financed in part by the College Football Association
(CFA). The CFA was formed in 1977 by most of the dominant football-
playing colleges-including the members of the Atlantic Coast Con-
ference, the Big Eight Conference, Southeastern Conference, and the
Western Athletic Conference, plus the major independents such as
Notre Dame, Pittsburgh, and Penn State. The only comparable institu-
tions which have not joined the CFA are the 20 members of the Big Ten
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Plaintiffs' factual contentions
The plaintiffs' complaint focused on the restraint of their
economic freedom through coerced cooperation in the sale of
television football rights. As a condition to membership, all
universities were required to submit their television broadcast
rights to the NCAA, pursuant to the authority of its constitu-
tional provision that "televising of intercollegiate football games
of member institutions shall be controlled by bylaws enacted by
the Association." The NCAA, as exclusive bargaining agent for
its members, except for limited "exception telecasts" with its
approval, negotiated with the networks to sell all members'
contractual television rights at a "minimum aggregate fee," i.e., a
fixed floor under the total compensation received by members for
their television rights in the seasons covered by the contract. 6 The
contracts specified the total number of games televised in any
season, and the maximum number of games that a university
could televise. While the 1982-1985 contracts added CBS and the
Turner Cable Broadcasting System,37 the "new" NCAA plan
and Pacific-10 Conferences. The CFA was formed to give its members a
stronger voice in asserting their interests within the NCAA, and the CFA
itself is an affiliate member of the NCAA.
36 The NCAA historically made "recommendations" to the con-
tracting network regarding the precise amount to be paid each university
selling its television broadcasting rights under the contract. These
recommendations were implemented by the contracting network and
eliminated negotiation of the rights fee altogether. The rights fee
recommended by the NCAA, and paid by the contracting network, was
derived by a formula and was always the same for each contracting
university operating under NCAA controls. See generally 546 F. Supp.
at 1276 et seq. See also, for the following summary of plaintiffs'
position, Respondents' Response to Application for a Stay, submitted to
the Supreme Court in S. Ct. No. A-24 on July 19, 1983.
37 The NCAA was very active in 1981-82, not only in rearranging
its television controls, but in assuring that no doubt was left as to its
assumption of absolute control over its members' television rights. The
NCAA adopted an "official interpretation" of its bylaws, stating that
"[t]he Association shall control all forms of televising of the intercolle-
giate football games of member institutions during the traditional
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operated as before; the networks eliminated competition between
themselves for individual games, giving a single network absolute
market control over specific games.
The complaint also alleged that a member's attempt to market
television rights independent of the NCAA met a myriad "of
NCAA sanctions, ranging from reprimand to expulsion... "
as when the NCAA threatened plans of the College Football
Association to televise football. The threatened sanctions effec-
tively deprived the members of "a fully rounded intercollegiate
athletic program."38
The defense summarized
The NCAA contended that its controls and network contracts
were reasonable. The controls protected gate attendance that
might otherwise be injured or destroyed by television. A study by
the NCA~s Television Committee and a report by the National
Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, as well as
follow-up studies, analyses, and reports, showed that uncon-
trolled television substantially affected gate attendance. 39
football season. . . . Any commitment by a member institution with
respect to the televising or cablecasting of its football games in future
seasons necessarily would be subject to the terms of the NCAA football
television plan applicable to such season." Similarly, the NCAA
amended its constitution in 1982 to provide that all "telecasting,
cablecasting or otherwise televising of intercollegiate football games of
member institutions shall be controlled by bylaws enacted by the
Association." The NCAA was quick to implement this clarification of
its absolute authority by threatening members of the CFA, who were
attempting to market a television package of their own, with the full
panoply of NCAA sanctions (including expulsion) should the CFA
members go through with their plan. The plan was therefore aban-
doned.
38 The NCAA also is active in regulating sports activities of its
members other than football, but football is the only sport in which the
NCAA has taken unto itself the power to regulate the televising of
college athletic events.
39 These conclusions were presented to the entire membership which
approved a procedure which has evolved over the years whereby the
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Over the last 30 years, more than 90 percent of the member-
ship, voting for the principles of negotiation or the television
plan, favored the plan. The three main television networks held
television rights at different times. ABC held the contract from
1978 through 1981, but from 1982 through 1985 there were
contracts with ABC and CBS, after extensive negotiations with
all three °
The NCA~s television contracts provided that the network
would select the games to be televised and would negotiate the
rights and fees with the host college under a specific game
contract for a particular game. The "only" restrictions were that
the contract must be with the network under contract with the
NCAA and must contain terms consistent with the current
NCAA television plan. The host college was free to refuse the sale
of its television rights, and had the freedom to negotiate a price
for its rights. However, the NCAA suggested to the network a
formula for differentiating between the fees for national and
regional telecasts, and occasionally suggested individual game
Television Committee would hold hearings to gather all pertinent
information, submit a questionnaire to all the members to ascertain
their views, prepare detailed principles of negotiation consistent there-
with, and submit the principles of negotiation to the council and then to
the membership for a referendum vote. After a favorable vote, the
Television Committee would negotiate with the various networks and
make one or more contracts on the best available terms, subject to the
approval of the council. The Television Committee also would formu-
late the football television plan which was approved by the council.
Both the contracts and the football television plan were consistent with
the principles of negotiation approved by the membership.
40 These contracts provided for a series of college games to be
televised on Saturday afternoons during the fall season, some of which
were nationally televised, whereas others were regionally televised. They
provided for annual minimum aggregate compensation to be paid by
each network for the rights to televise the NCAA series games. For
1982, the aggregate rights fees to be paid by each network totaled at
least $29,500,000, and could have exceeded that sum. Subtracted from
that sum, however, was an assessment to be paid to the NCAA and
rights fees for certain Division I-AA, II, and III NCAA football
championships and regular season games.
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fees. In every instance, the rights fee paid for each game was
established by the network, subject to agreement by the host
college and the consent of the visiting institution."
The NCAA argued that a college's right to negotiate its own
prices was unimpaired. If a college chose to accept what a
network offered, without negotiating or bargaining, the price was
not a combination or conspiracy between the network and the
NCAA. The NCAA/network contracts merely ensured minimum
aggregate compensation for committing exclusive future rights to
televise a series of NCAA members' games; they did not provide
a maximum price or ceiling or in any way restrain the price a
college could negotiate. It also argued that the minimum aggre-
gate compensation provision did not injure plaintiffs, and that
they lacked standing to attack it. Moreover, because the NCAA
committed rights exclusively to the contracting networks, it was
necessary to provide minimum aggregate compensation for all
rights .42
The NCAA argued under the rule of reason that the legality
of its television plan and network contracts was shown by their
overall procompetitive effect. The principal controls-limitations
on team appearances and number of broadcasts in a season-
benefited collegiate football in competition with alternative
products. Other restraints, such as restrictions on sponsors,
41 The portion of each individual game rights fee to be paid by the
host institution to the visiting institution was subject to negotiation
between the participating colleges. In most instances, conference rules
dictated the sharing of rights fees between conference members. The
University of Oklahoma, as a member of the Big Eight Conference, and
the University of Georgia, as a member of the Southeastern Conference,
were bound by conference sharing arrangements which were outside the
ambit of NCAA regulations.
42 Moreover, plaintiffs' price-fixing claim, it was argued, offered no
basis for equitable relief in any event. Future football television would
occur under profoundly changed circumstances. For the first time, the
NCAA contracted with two networks rather than one. Thus, it was then
impossible to infer what pricing conduct would occur in the future.
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commercial time, and institutional promotional segments, bene-
fited college football and higher education. 43
These procompetitive benefits were possible through the
NCAAs "packaging" of college football broadcasts. In a free
market only two results, both detrimental to NCAA collegiate
football, are possible. Either television is oversaturated and no
product effectively marketed, or a few superpowers dominate less
powerful colleges. The NCAA argued that its policies broadened
football's entertainment value through greater variety and more
balanced, competitive games. The athletic programs of all mem-
bers were strengthened by spreading television and revenue op-
portunities fairly; the distribution of revenue prevented
domination by prominent institutions.
These procompetitive effects, explained the NCAA, should be
measured in a relevant product market that included all television
programming. Within that market, the NCAs restraints were
not anticompetitive, but enhanced the variety and quality of
college football programming.
Lower court opinions
The district court was not convinced by the NCAA's argu-
ment." It found for the plaintiff on theories of monopolization,
43 The NCAA argued that it had gradually relaxed football televi-
sion controls, so that college football had become more competitive on
television while still maintaining its athletic and economic benefits. The
number of team appearances permitted per season had been increased,
and the total exposure of games had been expanded. The NCAA also
had instituted a supplementary series of broadcasts distributed for
presentation on cable television for colleges not appearing frequently on
the network series. The success of the NCAAs efforts to promote
collegiate football as a competitive product for television was apparent
to all, it contended: televising of college football thrived, net revenues to
the NCAA membership increased dramatically, and the alleged adverse
impact of television on live gate attendance was curtailed.
44 Indeed, the district judge was rather scathing in his criticism of
the NCAAs conduct: "It is regrettable that an organization such as
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1021 1986
1022 : The antitrust bulletin
boycott, and cartelization 4 1 and enjoined the NCAA from pro-
hibiting its members from negotiating separate television con-
tracts.4 The court rejected the notion "that college football or
indeed higher education itself, is not a business."'47 It determined
that college football schools maximize revenue and cut costs,
while maintaining high-quality competition to keep their product
attractive.48 It also rejected the gate attendance argument. The
NCAA studies were more than two decades old 49 and had been
conducted in a controlled market. 0 Additionally, the studies
demonstrated an inadequate causal relationship between the de-
cline in gate attendance and televised college football. 1 The
NCAA, which has served many purposes over the years, should be
found to be in violation of the laws of the United States. The Court
would only observe that the wound which has today been suffered by
NCAA is a self-inflicted wound. NCAA has strayed far from the
purposes for which it was organized." The court then raised an ex-
tremely provocative question. "The court does not know and need not
determine whether the NCAA administration, in formulating the con-
trols at issue, was motivated by genuine concern for NCAA members,
by a lust for power or by rank greed." 546 F. Supp. at 1328.
45 Id. at 1325-28.
46 Id. at 1328.
47 Id. at 1288. The court went on to state that colleges are compet-
ing for students, faculty, government grants, and philanthropic support.
It closed out the argument by observing: "The objectives and the past
achievements of our institutions of higher learning have earned them
great praise and exalted position in our social fabric. Nonetheless, it is a
business and a business operated by professionals." Id.
48 Id.
49 The judge stated that it "strains logic past the breaking point" to
assert that studies conducted 25 years before are still viable. Id. at 1295.
50 The court stated that it simply did not know the effects of
uncontrolled television on gate attendance. Id.
51 The court noted, for instance, that during the years of the study,
gate attendance had indeed dropped when television expanded. How-
ever, it also noted that college enrollment had likewise dropped, raising
at least the possibility that one major source of attendance, college
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NCAA!s plan did not limit college football to protect gate
attendance; on many Saturdays there were nine hours of televised
college football.2
As for protecting competition on the playing field, the
NCANs regulation of scholarships and recruitment promoted
parity, rather than regulating televised college football.53 The
NCAAgs argument that increased revenues would create a "power
elite" was not convincing because increased revenue was limited
to college sports programs," and a "power elite" already existed
despite the contracts. 5 The NCAA was really arguing that com-
petition would destroy the market, and such a defense could not
justify antitrust violations. 6
In deciding the monopolization issue, the court decided the
relevant market was "live college football television. 157 On Satur-
students at the various institutions, may have dropped. The court said
that while the NCAA sought to minimize this concern, the studies had
not taken into account a logically significant factor. Id.
52 Id. at 1296.
53 The court also noted that the NCAAs restrictions were more
likely to reward and promote uncompetitive football performance than
to promote competition. Id.
54 The court stated: "The plaintiffs will continue to play football
whatever the ultimate outcome of this litigation and they will do so at a
profit. But other sports currently offered at those schools will suffer."
Id. at 1310.
55 The court stated that such schools as Notre Dame, University of
Alabama, University of Nebraska, Pennsylvania State University, Ohio
State University, University of Michigan, and the University of Pitts-
burgh were firmly established in the so-called "power elite" and listed
the University of Georgia and Clemson University as recent arrivals-
demonstrating that it was possible to break into the elite.
56 The judge stated that if contests became too one-sided, the
market would correct the problem by forcing the networks to shift to
closer games to restore their ratings. It added that if a "power elite"
emerged to abuse its competitive edge, then antitrust remedies would be
available to those injured.
57 546 F. Supp. at 1296-97. The court noted that defining the
relevant market was often the most difficult part of deciding a monopo-
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day afternoons, televised college football is free from profes-
sional football competition, the most logical substitute." Since
televised college football is perishable, and interest wanes after
games, it does not compete against the spectrum of programming
available other times. -9 The alternative programming that compet-
ing networks broadcast against college football establishes it as
the market, exclusive of other entertainment 0 College football
did not compete with general entertainment programs which were
outside the college football television market.6 ' Moreover, the
networks were willing to suffer net revenue losses to broadcast
football, eager to condition affluent college graduates to watch
their programming.62 The price networks paid hinged on the
ability to attract male college graduates, making it a unique
market63
The NCAA argued that the buyers in the market were televi-
sion advertisers, 61 but the district court agreed with the plaintiffs
lization case. It stated that the argument was even more difficult here
because, since college football on television had for so long been outside
the free market, it was impossible to determine what the characteristics
of the market would have been if the market were free. Hence, it
admitted "the definition of a relevant market necessarily involves some
guesswork."
58 Id. at 1282.
59 Id.
60 The court noted that one network "went dark" when college
football was being broadcast by a competitor. That is, rather than
sending its affiliates any programming to compete with the football
game, the network left the affiliates to fend for themselves. Essentially
the network was conceding that other types of entertainment could not
substitute for college football. Id. at 1297.
61 Id.
62 The court explained that it was impressed by the argument that
college graduates have buying power which far exceeds their number. Id.
at 1299.
63 Id. at 1300.
64 Id. at 1298.
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that the networks were the buyers. The antitrust injury related to
the exclusive contract, and the buyers of that contract were the
networks." The sellers were the colleges playing football, 6 and
they were unique because only colleges produced quality amateur
football. 67
The court found that the NCAA monopolized college football
television broadcasts, 68 that the NCAA controlled virtually all
college football broadcasts, 69 and that the NCAA erected an
insurmountable barrier to new competition by prohibiting com-
petitive broadcasts.70 The court also found the NCAA restraints
unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act under both per se
and rule of reason analyses. Its sophisticated per se inquiry found
that although current contracts technically allowed negotiations
between networks, they rarely occurred, 7 and that the minimum
aggregate fees paid by the networks determined what each college
received.72 This clearly circumvented market forces73 and, under
65 Id.
66 In a perfectly free market, the court observed, these schools
would be competing to sell broadcast rights to their football games. It
then stated: "NCAA has, by virtue of its controls over football televi-
sion, literally commandeered this right by acting as exclusive bargaining
agent for the sale of college football television rights." Id. at 1282.
67 High school football, the court stated, had never been broadcast
on a network level and had not developed the same appeal as college
football. Id.
68 In fact, the NCAA did not deny that if college football consti-
tuted the relevant market, then it was a monopolist.
69 546 F. Supp. at 1282.
70 Id.
71 The court found, without much discussion, that the networks
"have no intention of bidding" for the rights to broadcast a particular
game. Second, the court declared that when one network's offer had
been turned down, the other network was in an unacceptably strong
bargaining position. Id. at 1293.
72 The court found that the networks computed the amount to be
paid each team by subtracting the eight percent the NCAA received
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Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 74 the
restraint distorted free market pricing and output levels.7 The
court rejected the NCANs joint venture justification, declaring
that the cooperation required for football did not extend to
exclusive NCAA television contracts.7 1 It also rejected the justifi-
cation that a per se analysis did not apply to voluntary associa-
tions, 7 ruling that the NCAA was not truly voluntary, and that
the Sherman Act applied in either event, 78 and that the restraints
were not ancillary to regulations promoting amateurism . 7 The
court found the NCAA's promotion of amateurism laudable, but
from its share of the proceeds and then dividing the minimum aggregate
fee by the number of telecasts-with regional telecasts receiving some-
what less money than national ones.
73 As an example, the court noted that on one weekend in 1981,
Oklahoma and the University of Southern California, two teams with
traditionally strong football programs, played and their game was
carried on more than 200 stations. Two other teams, Citadel and
Appalachian State, played and their game was broadcast over four
stations. Yet all four teams received the same amount of money.
74 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
75 546 F. Supp. at 1305. This of course raises an interesting
question. If one assumes that the justification for the per se rule is that
judicial experience teaches that certain practices so nearly always deni-
grate competition that affirmative considerations of social policy dictate
that they be condemned without further analysis, is not a court which
seeks to discover competitive or anticompetitive effects in a policy which
has been condemned as per se illegal not seeking to reinvent the wheel
and hence sacrificing the policy aims of the per se rule?
76 Id. at 1306. The court distinguished the NCANs restraints from
those in Broadcast Music. It stated the Broadcast Music restraints were
necessary to successfully market the product-music. The NCCA re-
straints, it declared, were not necessary.
77 Id. at 1308.
78 Id. at 1309.
79 Id.
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did not find the restraints logical extensions of amateurism." And
because the NCANs restraints isolated broadcasts from the free
market,8' its monopoly power precluded this particular justifica-
tion.82 Lastly, the court ruled that the NCAA was a group boycott
that prohibited members from playing nonmembers on televi-
sion83 and from selling to certain buyers." Under the rule of
reason85 the restraints were unreasonable by their nature and
character and by their circumstances and history enhanced
prices.86 If designed to stimulate gate attendance, the restraints
controlled prices,87 and their nature and character unreasonably
80 Moreover, the court found that there were sufficient alternative
methods of proceeding which would protect the amateur status of
college football. Id.
81 Id. at 1310-11.
82 In summing up, the court stated: "[T]he NCAA television con-
trols are more than mere ancillary restraints. They are much more
far-reaching than necessary to accomplish the legitimate purposes of
NCAA. They not only inhibit competition, they destroy it. NCAA has
market power, and has employed that power to both fix prices and
restrict output." Id. at 1311.
83 The court here relied upon Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
& Light Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). In that case, the Supreme Court held
unlawful a gas company's refusal to supply gas to customers who used
the plaintiff's gas burners. The burners did not have a certificate of
approval from the American Gas Association. The defendant was a
member of the association. It claimed that by refusing to provide gas, it
was simply obeying association guidelines. The Supreme Court found
the purpose of the rules was not to promote safety but to insulate other
burner manufacturers from competition. 546 F Supp. at 1313.
84 546 F. Supp. at 1312, 1313.
85 The court noted that the per se rule was developed to abrogate
detailed rule of reason analysis and also recognized that its own per se
examination of the facts had been fairly detailed.
86 546 F. Supp. at 1315.
87 Indeed, the court opined that the controls took money from
more powerful schools and gave it to less powerful schools. Id.
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restricted competition by limiting the number of football broad-
casts ."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's price-fixing holding, 9 but reversed the group boycott
finding.: To the extent the NCAA 91 restricted output and raised
prices, its restrictions were unlawful per se.92 The restraints
facially did not make markets more competitive, and could not
fit the narrow Broadcast Music exception to the per se rule. 9 The
restraints tended to restrict competition, 91 and were not necessary
to protect gate attendance. 9 Total viewership, live and televised,
must be considered in evaluating the restrictions. But argument
that they might enhance total viewership was "speculative," 97 and
through the restrictions less-favored products were favored over
more-favored ones." This promotion of athletic parity was re-
jected as an unacceptable argument against competition because
it might otherwise destroy the market.9 The defense that the
88 The court said that without controls, the networks would show
fewer games but more games by the same teams.
89 707 F.2d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 1983).
90 Id. The decision was by a vote of 2-1. The dissenter, Judge
Barrett, stated that he would hold all the NCAA television broadcasting
restrictions lawful.
91 For a discussion of naked restraints, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note
8, at 192-97.
92 For a discussion of the per se rule, see id.
93 441 U.S. 1.
94 707 F.2d at 1153.
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restrictions enabled NCAA football to be marketed as a series' °
was not analyzed; the restraints were held facially anticompetitive
and per se illegal."°'
Under the rule of reason, 02 the appeals court found that the
restrictions illegally concentrated the market by reducing the
hundreds of vendors of college football to one-the NCAA 03
College football was found to be the relevant market since' °
football advertising cost 22 times other programming,05 and
because other programming was dissimilar and not interchange-
able.'10 Even if too narrow, a broader definition would not
significantly decrease market power for rule of reason pur-
poses. 7 The NCAA's market power increased the risks of carteli-
zation. 01
100 Essentially, the NCAA was arguing that it restrained intrabrand
competition to promote interbrand competition. Id. at 1155.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1157. The court indicated that it was undertaking this
analysis because it was likely the U.S. Supreme Court would be asked to
review the plan.
103 The court stated that since the broadcasts could be sold only as a
package, only buyers with large financial resources would be able to
buy. Similarly, buyers who wanted to broadcast football on an occa-
sional basis rather than each weekend in the fall would also be
foreclosed.
104 707 F.2d at 1158.
105 As did the district court, the appeals court took notice of the
high income level of college graduates who are attracted to college
football.
106 The court noted that often such programming as old movies,
comedies, or cartoons are broadcast opposite football.
107 The court stated that the degree of market share which is
significant for rule of reason purposes is different from that needed to
prove monopolization. "Therefore, any concern that the market defini-
tion may overstate power may be assuaged by attributing less signifi-
cance to the market share possessed. . . . The district court found the
NCAA controlled virtually 100 percent of the relevant market, televised
college football." 707 R2d at 1158-59.
108 Id. at 1159.
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The appeals court did reverse the group boycott finding. The
restrictions did not shield members from all competition,'19 and
because the possibility existed that expelled members could play
NCAA teams on television, 10 this did not constitute a naked
attempt to restrain competition."'
The Supreme Court decision
The NCAA argued 2 that the restraints were the product of a
lawful cooperative joint venture and that its procompetitive
contracts required to televise games "3 made this product more
competitive against other televised entertainment.14 It advanced
theories that the restrictions aided competition, or were competi-
tively neutral and not prohibited. Its first theory was that the
arrangements produced on-the-field balance making college foot-
ball games more competitive,"5 spreading appearances, and in-
creasing the visibility of more colleges to potential football
109 The NCAA and the broadcasters were not in competition, the
court noted. Further, there was no allegation that the broadcasters were
seeking to protect themselves from competition. Id. at 1161.
110 Id.
M Here, the court said, it could not find the expulsion provisions
unreasonable. Id.
112 Certiorari was granted at 104 S. Ct. 272 (1983).
113 The NCAA argued that its rules were necessary to create a
product which it then furnished to television networks. Petitioner's
Brief at 17, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
114 Petitioner's Brief at 15. Of course, in making this argument, the
NCAA was contradicting findings by the lower courts that there was no
available entertainment on Saturday afternoons which could compete
with live college football games. See supra notes 95-113 and accom-
panying text.
115 Petitioner's Brief at 20-21. Essentially, this was the reassertion of
an argument the district court had rejected as not supported in fact or
law. See supra notes 118-157 and accompanying text.
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recruits."' Such parity in television appearances would further
balance teams making games more exciting and attractive."7 It
next theorized that its exclusive contracts reduced network trans-
action costs, increasing interbrand competition,"8 and enabled a
network to promote college football without competing networks
free riding." 9 These arrangements increased gate attendance that
enhanced live game excitement, 2 ' and aided smaller schools
dependent on gate receipts without television revenues. 2' It last
hypothesized an absence of market power, and a properly defined
market that included advertisers that could readily switch among
televised entertainment.'2 Since its share of a market of all
116 However, this argument ignored lower court findings that
without the controls, schools that would not be selected by the networks
would be able to broadcast on a regional scale and hence attract
prospects from their area. See 546 F. Supp. at 1294.
117 Petitioner's Brief at 21-22.
118 Id. at 22.
119 The problem with this argument was, again, that it ignored the
facts. Under the proposed contract, there were two other networks that
could receive free rides from advertising of NCAA football done by any
network. However, the free-rider problem need not have emerged or at
least could have been minimized by the fact that the networks should
have been able to promote the game they were carrying. See 546 F.
Supp. at 1296-1300.
120 Of course, the district court had noted that there were often
already nine hours of college football available, so that the NCAA
restrictions were not, in fact, helping protect the gates from competi-
tion. Also, it found there was no credible evidence that television
inhibited gate attendance. Id. at 1295-96. In fact, there may be evidence
to the contrary. Such attractions as the major college bowl games
continue to draw large crowds despite television. This would seem to
suggest thgt a high-quality game will draw fans regardless of whether
the game is televised.
121 Petitioner's Brief at 25-26. But these schools might well obtain
regional contracts that would make up for their lost gate revenue.
122 Id. at 41-42.
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televised entertainment would then be low, its practices would be
lawful. '
Respondents argued that the NCAAs restrictions illegally
restricted the number of televised games per se.'24 This artificially
inflated broadcast prices and, through restrictions on members'
negotiating freedoms, further competition was significantly re-
duced in the only televised college sport regulated by the
NCAA.1' Moreover, respondents argued that the restrictions were
not practically necessary as those in Broadcast Music,'26 and that
income was not equalized among colleges as privileged colleges
made multiple television appearances.'27 Indeed, without the re-
straints more local games could be televised,' and since there was
no credible evidence that live attendance would then drop, 129 local
colleges would benefit. And since the NCAA possessed market
power in the market for college football television broadcasts, the
restraints should be found unlawful whether under per se or rule
of reason analyses. Because the networks had no satisfactory
substitute for Saturday college football, prices for college broad-
cast rights were inflated by the restrictions,'30 and even if the
123 Id.
124 Respondent's Brief at 10-15, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
125 Specifically, the respondents were referring to basketball, which
was satisfactorily governed by market forces. Respondent's Brief at 29.
126 Id.
127 The schools who appeared received the payments from the
networks. The respondents argued that if the NCAA was interested in
sharing wealth, it could simply require one school with large revenues to
contribute to another school with few revenues, rather than attempting
to remotely control the flow of revenues by limiting price for games and
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market were to include substitutes, the NCAA still had market
power.'3
The Justice Department intervened, contending that the
NCAAs rules should not be evaluated under either per se or rule
of reason tests, 32 but at the midpoint of a "continuum" between
two traditional poles' recently adopted by the Court. 4 The
Justice Department favored a Broadcast Music'35 two-prong in-
quiry to determine the legality of joint marketing arrangements:
whether the challenged practice "facially appears . . . to . . .
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output,"'3 6 and whether it was designed not to increase effi-
131 Id.
132 United States' Brief at 7, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). "It is our
submission that antitrust analysis is not restricted to these two extremes,
a Per Se category that precludes an examination of actual effects and an
elaborate 'full blown' category that requires precise measurement of
markets and market power."
133 Under this position, the circumstances of the particular case
would decide how far the court must look to determine whether a
restraint was indeed unlawful. Some restraints might escape per se
condemnation and yet be quickly condemned upon a cursory evaluation
of their purpose or their effect on the market. In other instances, a more
detailed analysis might be required. The United States' approach seems
to have suggested that the record be analyzed as thoroughly as necessary
for the court to conclude that the challenged restraint would inhibit
competition more than it would help it.
134 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979);
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
135 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
136 United States' Brief at 9. This first step sounds like the per se
analysis as articulated in United States v. Northern Pacific Ry., 356 U.S.
1 (1958). "[T]here are certain arguments or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry . . ." 356 U.S. at 5.
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ciency,37 but to limit competition.'38 Further, Justice asked the
Court to determine whether the joint venture could work without
the challenged restraints.' 39 Applying its test, Justice argued that
the NCA~s television controls were facially unlawful'" since they
appeared to restrict output,'4' without increasing the NCAAs
efficiency.4
2
Although acknowledging that such restraints are normally
illegal per se, 143 the Supreme Court did not invalidate them.'1'
Within the context of collegiate football, "horizontal" restraints
are essential to product availability,'45 while the other restraints
may preserve college football's character and integrity.'" But, as
137 United States' Brief at 9.
138 Rather, an efficiency justification will carry the day only if the
restraint, while promoting the efficiency of the defendant, forces the
rest of the market to become more competitive by passing efficiency
savings to consumers. Id. at 10.
139 Id. at 11.
140 The United States argued that the restraints were not per se
unlawful, but that they should be condemned under the analysis
outlined in the brief. Id. at 12-15.
141 Id. at 15-17.
142 Id. at 17-19.
143 104 S. Ct. at 2960. The Court characterized the NCAA restraints
as horizontal price-fixing and output limitation and stated that they are
"ordinarily condemned as illegal per se." Id.
144 Id. at 2961.
145 Id. The Court went out of its way to note that its decision was
not based on a lack of familiarity with the pernicious effects of
price-fixing or output restraint, or on any respect for the NCAAs
historic role in the "preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate
athletics." Id. at 2960.
146 Id. at 2961. The Court specifically referred to such matters as
field size, game rules, and the preservation of an "academic tradition"
to accompany the sport.
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for the restrictions making the game more popular or more
competitive,147 the restraints only inflated price, decreased out-
put,'4 and eliminated smaller broadcasters unable to bid on broad
spectrum television rights.2 49 The NCAA had sufficient power in
the market of televised collegiate football to generate anticom-
petitive effects; its rules were a "naked restraint" on price and
output and an exercise of that market power.150
The Court noted that the 1950s studies showing television's
adverse impact on gate attendance 1 ' were not relevant to today's
market, and would be at odds with the role of the Sherman Act in
assuring that competition remains the basic American economic
policy.'52 While many of the NCAA rules were justified because
they made the game more competitive and more attractive to
broadcasters, the television restraints were not of that category. '
147 Id. at 2962.
148 The Court declared, in fact, that the coercive aspects of the plan
made the market unresponsive to consumer demand-a point it found
"perhaps the most significant." It is interesting to note here that the
Court seems at least implicitly to be adopting the view of Professor
Bork, who also argues that consumer welfare is the proper goal of
antitrust law. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 81-89.
149 The Court found that many small television broadcasters who
might wish to broadcast one or two games of a locally popular team
were denied this chance because only broadcasters who wished to
purchase rights covering all the NCAA teams could compete effectively.
150 104 S. Ct. at 2965. "When there is an agreement not to compete
in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is required'."
151 The Court made it clear it was referring to attendance at other
games rather than attendance at the game that was being broadcast. Id.
at 2969.
152 The Court observed that under the rule of reason, a restraint
could not be justified on the ground that competition was unreasonable.
Id.
153 The Court held that the television plan was "not even arguably
tailored to serve such an interest." The Court noted the plan did not
attempt to regulate the money a college might spend. Moreover, it stated
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1035 1986
1036 : The antitrust bulletin
Because these restraints were not classic price-fixing, or necessary
adjuncts to a lawful plan, the Court invoked a test functionally
indistinguishable from the rule of reason. '54 It rejected the idea
that without market power technical restraints should be permit-
ted.155 Although consistent with Chicago school theory that only
market power can impair consumer wealth maximization,'56 this
idea was rejected because as a matter of law the lack of market
power "does not justify a naked restraint," thereby rejecting
consumer wealth and efficiency justifications.'57 There must be
procompetitive reasons offered in defense of restraints on com-
petition. "8 But here the challenged restraints were not intended to
equalize competition, or neutralize a "power elite," but consti-
there was no evidence the restriction produced any more equality than
would other methods. The Court agreed with the district court's finding
that more games would be broadcast and more schools would receive
television revenue under a free market. Id.
154 See source cited supra note 27.
155 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
156 The lead attorney for the NCAA in the case before the Supreme
Court, as noted above, was Frank Easterbrook, an adherent of the
Chicago school. Id. As also noted above, the Chicago school employs a
theory of market power which usually will result in a much broader and
more elastic market definition and hence less market power for antitrust
defendants than do the more traditional schools of thought. See, e.g.,
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV.
937 (1981). The authors argue that geographic and product substitution
evidence should be more freely allowed and define market power as the
"ability to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many
sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable. . . ." Hence, if a
firm or group of firms acting together do not have the ability to raise
prices above the competitive level (market power), then the firm's
conduct cannot have a pernicious effect on consumer wealth maximiza-
tion because consumers would not be forced to pay a higher price.
157 The decision thus affirms the rule that a naked restraint is
unlawful even where the defendant does not have the market power or
the ability to set prices at levels other than those arrived at by market
forces.
158 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
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tuted an agreement that restricted output.'59 The Court obviously
rejected a one-dimensional antitrust approach, but the debate for
one continues.
The Chicago school's limits on antitrust
Is antitrust an "imperfect" tool for the regulation of competi-
tion?' 6° Is antitrust's proper goal the increase of economic effi-
ciency?' 61 Are traditional antitrust methods effective?' 62 Should
categories of per se restraints shrink?'63 Does the rule of reason
lack content?'1 Are efforts to provide content "snipe hunts"?' 65
Sophisticated business operations require cooperation, '6 and anti-
trust must weigh social policies,' 67 but do its enforcement costs
outweigh its benefits? 61 If antitrust costs are the loss of beneficial
159 Id. at 2970.
160 Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 39.
161 Id. at 14-16.
162 Id. at 9-10.
163 "We see competitive benefits in practices that once were thought
to be uniformly pernicious." Easterbrook states that the Supreme Court
has removed tying arrangements from the per se category "in all but
name." In addition, he states the Court has "stood by" while the lower
courts have abrogated the per se rule in regard to boycotts. Id. at 10.
164 Easterbrook argues that judges and juries are incapable of
determining accurately whether an agreement helps or hinders competi-
tion. Id. at 5-6.
165 Id. at 13.
166 Id. at 1.
167 Id. at 3.
168 "There are good theoretical reasons to believe that the costs of
(some antitrust) enforcement efforts have exceeded the benefits . . .
antitrust is costly. The judges act with imperfect information about the
effects of practices at stake. The costs of action and information are the
limits of antitrust." Id. at 4.
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1037 1986
1038 : The antitrust bulletin
business practices, 69 society loses efficiencies, but if only effi-
ciency determines antitrust results, the law will lose greater
competitive justifications.' 7
A more relaxed antitrust scheme not only will allow "socially
undesirable" behavior through error,'"' but also will allow cooper-
ation that produces market power that may not be self-correct-
able. Judge Easterbrook has produced a series of presumptions to
filter efficiency-enhancing arrangements. 7 2 Filters highlight actual
competitive effects, as the first concentrates on market power 7 1
and ignores restraints unless imposed with the market power to
raise prices above competitive levels that will harm consumers. 75
Easterbrook's filters are a "quick, painless and correct end to
litigation"''7 6 that stimulate market entry, 7 and will not invalidate
such cooperative ventures as joint advertising that absent market
power' cannot reduce consumer welfare.
169 He states that often a business practice will be successful and
efficient without the businessman being able to explain why it is
procompetitive. Once pro-efficiency explanations have been developed,
the practice has often been eliminated because of court action. Id. at
6-7.
170 Id. at 8-9.
171 "The per-se rule condemns whole categories of practices even
though some practices in these categories are beneficial. The court
permits such overbreadth because all rules are imprecise . I." d. at
15.
172 Id. at 17.
173 "Market power is the ability to raise price significantly without
losing so many sales that the increase is unprofitable." Id. at 20.
174 Id.
175 "When there is no market power, the market is better than the
judicial process in discriminating the beneficial from the detrimental."
Id. at 21.
176 Id. at 23.
177 Id. at 21-22.
178 Id. at 21. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967);
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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Easterbrook's second filter rejects claims not relatable to a
defendant's increased profit.Y7 9 If not profitable, a defendant will
stop business losses before antitrust proscribes its conduct.' 0 If
unprofitable restraints persist, because a market does not "per-
fectly penalize" misconduct, markets still "do so better than the
next best alternative"'' and antitrust impositions should be re-
sisted.
The next filter operates if a restraint survives the first two
"threshold" tests, and has potential competitive benefits.8 2
Naked restraints will have already been condemned,'83 and "ob-
viously harmless" practices will have been identified. However,
the potential effects of partial integration, 8 4 including tying,
restricted dealing, and other vertical restraints, will be analyzed
through this filter.8 And if other firms in the market have not
adopted the restraint under examination,'86 the case should be
dismissed. "Potentially anticompetitive outcomes" require multi-
ple adoption by competitors before they will destroy competi-
tion. 87
179 Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 24.
180 "The market brings home to the offender any losses it imposes
on others-and it brings them home more quickly than courts do. ...
The sanction imposed by the business losses will clear up the practice in
due course." Id.
181 He states that this is consistent with "the entire corpus of
antitrust doctrine" which states that competitive markets do better thanjudges or regulators in rewarding practices that create economic benefit
and penalizing others. Id.
182 Id. at 29.




187 Id. An example given is that if Sony uses a resale price main-
tenance agreement for its televisions and General Electric does not,
dealers who want to cheat on the cartel can do so by cutting the prices
of the G.E. sets.
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1039 1986
1040 : The antitrust bulletin
The fourth filter focuses on product demand and whether it
rises or falls after the restraint's adoption. If demand rises, the
benefits of the restraint exceed its costs, but if it falls, the
restraint has a negative impact. Also, if a restraint is inefficient,
latent competition will challenge the practice.' Thus a firm
engaging in a practice for five years without losing market share
has not restrained trade illegally.Y8 9 If entry barriers are especially
low, then the number of years could be reduced.'19 A five-year
cushion might not have been intended by Easterbrook, but such a
period constructively immunizes a particular practice from anti-
trust enforcement while other, possibly more beneficial practices
are not.
Finally, Easterbrook questions whether a business rival should
be permitted to bring a suit that drives up a competitor's costs,' 9'
and proposes that a line be drawn between suits initiated by
competitors and those by consumers. Competitors will likely
inflict harm to protect their own inefficiencies,' 92 but their tactic
will elevate their own prices and drive customers to competitors,
or entice rivals to sell at lower prices through their greater skill.
In the first case, competition is helped, not harmed; in the second
case, there is no basis for antitrust enforcement. 93 Predatory
prices may injure rivals initially, but the market will self-correct
high monopoly prices. 94
188 Id. at 32.
189 Id. at 33. He states that five years is arbitrary. The factors should
include "entry hurdles" (costs not recoverable if entry is abandoned),
and entry lag ("the length of time entry takes even if there are low
hurdles and no barriers").
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 34.
193 Id. at 36.
194 Id. at 37.
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The filter theory promotes the Chicago school's concept of
economic efficiency, one that rejects competition as rivalry.'95
Since inefficient practices are market-corrected automatically,
efficient conduct must not be condemned, nor must society waste
resources on antitrust enforcement. Only competitors offering
consumers better deals 96 will survive the market; perhaps survival
correlates the filters with economic efficiency most clearly. If a
practice survives, it must serve consumer wealth maximization,197
and must be efficient.
The filter theory raises philosophical and pragmatic difficul-
ties. Its narrow ideology rejects rivalry for fostering social disin-
tegration. 98 But in the specific instance of rivalry as a goal of the
Federal Communications Commission, the broadcast industry
has not disintegrated. Whether the goal is rivalry or diversity, a
coherent antitrust policy will result. Efficiency can be combined
with other goals,'9 as in NCAA, to balance policy.20
That efficiency was not intended by Congress as the sole
antitrust goal is obvious.2 0 ' As expressed in Brown Shoe Co. v.
195 "[C]ompetition cannot be defined as the state of maximum
rivalry, for that is a formula of disintegration."
196 Id. at 29-30.
197 Id. at 31-32.
198 Id. at 13.
199 See Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non
Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
200 See H. HOVENKAMp, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 42
(1984). "All these alternative goals can be inconsistent with the goal of
maximizing allocative efficiency. In addition, many are inconsistent with
each other. If courts adopt any mixture of goals, antitrust is likely to be
guided by conflicting policies which must then be balanced against each
other. To be sure, this is not a unique phenomenon."
201 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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United States,2 2 legislative history displays Congress' fear of "a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy.""2 3 Here is clearly expressed a major competing goal,
one that does not preclude an antitrust role for actual efficien-
cies, but does preclude the speculation of final efficient results.
In the NCAA case, efficiency was acknowledged, 2°' but specu-
lative and logically weak efficiency arguments did not prevail
over a clearly expressed intent to restrict the plaintiffs' economic
and market freedoms. Lack of market power is no reason to
allow contracts or conspiracies that restrain trade. Markets can-
not be defined definitively; defendants may argue for a broad
television entertainment market, 205 while the Court can narrowly
define televised college football as the market.20 Markets through
the breadth of their definition can protect restraints, making
consistent policy difficult and business planning impossible. But
even without market power, economic freedom can be restrained.
Assuming the NCAA did not have market power, small broad-
casters could still not televise selected games, foreclosed not by
market forces but by the restraints. Local football teams were
shut out of television; national teams were denied all the televi-
sion revenue their abilities merited.
Moreover, restraints unrelated to profits should not be vali-
dated. Measuring a restraint's profit contribution is virtually
inpossible; a profit or loss can be attributed to production,
marketing, or random economic events. If the television re-
straints did not profit the NCAA, the decision did not harm
efficiency.
202 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1961) (challenge to a merger of two corpora-
tions; case brought under Clayton Act).
203 Id.
204 104 S. Ct. at 2960-61.
205 Petitioner's Brief at 33-36.
206 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
HeinOnline -- 31 Antitrust Bull. 1042 1986
A comment upon NCAA : 1043
Minimally competitive markets will not penalize restraints as
Easterbrook suggests,107 but restraints themselves will weaken
markets. If the NCAA could forbid the University of Oklahoma
from signing a network television contract unilaterally, the
network would sign another team, but not last year's NCAA
champion. Not every network need acquiesce before a university
is harmed substantially. Consumer behavior is not one-dimen-
sional, and product demand may increase in spite of a restraint.
Quality refinements, marketing programs, or competitive behav-
ior may overcome a restraint's negative impact. Was the increase
in NCAA football television audiences due to the restraint, to a
more affluent society that could afford television and more
leisure, to an increase in college graduates cheering their alma
mater, or to technological advances making games more exciting?
Should each restraint have a probationary period of five
years? Even a short-lived inefficient restraint might cause great
harm, but only if challenged initially would it be invalidated. The
NCAA!s restraints weren't challenged for five years, and not
before potential television revenues were denied meritorious col-
leges.
Efficiencies that reduce prices are not always attacked by
rivals. If so, defendants can countersue, or courts can award
attorneys' fees to thwart frivolous claims. But consumers do not
have the knowledge to mount antitrust attacks; only competitors
have access to the kind of information and the quantum of
resources necessary to pursue antitrust remedies. Television
viewers could not sue without knowledge of the NCAA contracts,
and could not without the resources. And, some advertisers may
have preferred the restraints for their ready access to monopo-
lized audiences. Only colleges eager to compete for viewers had
reason to sue, and had the resources.
In summary, efficiency is an important antitrust considera-
tion, but theoretical arguments that interfere with economic
freedom are not. If coercive in intent or purpose, any restraint on
economic liberty that restricts output through cooperation cannot
207 Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 23-25.
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be justified, and in NCAA the defendants' arguments about
efficient output restriction were denied. Efficiency is not the only
goal of antitrust, but one of several competing goals. The
Supreme Court has dealt the Chicago school its most solid body
block since Jay Brinswanger's days.
Conclusion
Alternative approaches to competition, as well as antitrust's
proper goals, have political underpinnings. One approach sees
competition synonymous with efficiency and consumer wealth
maximization through cooperation and economic integration.208 A
new "filter" approach defers to the laissez-faire values of a
minimal government,2" 9 while others see competition embracing
several economic and political goals. Values like economic oppor-
tunity and the prevention of economic coercion are equally
important goals, and government policing of free markets is
necessary to counterbalance the power of private capital.210 The
NCAA case establishes the Supreme Court's evaluation of effi-
ciency, that it will measure efficiencies against coercive intent and
effect, and will not permit trade to be restrained even if efficient
in the short term.2 '
208 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
209 See Easterbrook, supra note 28.
210 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 35-157 and accompanying text.
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